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TORTS-JOINT LIABILITY-RISK SPREADING-INDUSTRY-WIDE STANDARD-Hall v.
E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
For reasons primarily economic and practical, it was the custom of the explo-
sives industry during the 1950's-continuing until 1965-not to place any warning
labels upon individual blasting caps. Alleging that this practice constituted negli-
gence and created an unreasonable risk, plaintiffs in 18 separate actions scattered
across the country sought damages for accidents in which children were injured by
blasting caps. In most instances the manufacturer of the injury-causing cap was un-
known. These actions were finally consolidated into two cases decided simulta-
neously by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York.1
The question posed was whether a group of manufacturers and their trade associa-
tion, comprising virtually the entire blasting cap industry of the United States,
could be held jointly liable for injuries caused by their products. The court indi-
cated that under certain circumstances, illustrated by this litigation, an entire in-
dustry can be held liable for harm caused by its operations.
In the Hall case itself, three groups of injured victims were joined as plaintiffs,
and each asserted separate claims against two different manufacturers of blasting
caps. In each instance the producer of the injury-causing cap was identified, and
another manufacturer was joined on a theory of industry-wide responsibility for the
negligent design of the caps. In this action the court refused to impose joint lia-
bility because of the arbitrary basis on which the plaintiffs selected the non-producer
defendants, and because of an "absence of any demonstrable need for joint lia-
bility in administrative or remedial terms . 2..."2
However, in the companion Chance case, the court did allow the joinder of
substantially the entire national blasting cap industry and its trade association since
the particular manufacturers responsible for each plaintiff's injury could not be iden-
tified. Chance3 involved 13 children, allegedly injured by blasting caps in 12
unrelated accidents scattered throughout the country between 1955 and 1959. Plain-
tiff's claimed damages against the six major manufacturers of blasting caps in the
United States, and their trade association, on the grounds of negligence, common
law conspiracy, assault and strict liability in tort.
While the plaintiffs' injuries occurred at widely different times and places, the
complaint alleged certain features common to all of them. In each case a child
was injured when he came into the possession of, and accidentally detonated, a
dynamite blasting cap which lacked any warning message by which a child could
have been apprised of the dangerous nature of such caps. Among plaintiffs' cen-
tral contentions were the following: (1) the defendants had actual knowledge
that children were frequently injured by blasting caps, and through their trade as-
sociation kept statistics and other information which clearly indicated the danger-
ousness of their product to children; (2) the defendants, by their failure to place
warning labels on the blasting caps, had taken inadequate measures to minimize
the risk created by the manufacture of such products; and (3) the defendants'
common failure to place warning labels on the caps was the cause of the plaintiff's
injuries.
The defendants responded to the plaintiffs' allegations with a motion to dis-
1 Hall v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (1972). The decision includes
both the Hall case and a companion case, Chance v. E. L DuPont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp.
353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
2 345 F. Supp. at 386.
3 Hereafter no distinction will be drawn between Hall and Chance; both cases will be cited
generally as Hall.
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miss, arguing basically that they could not be held responsible on a theory of joint
liability. But the court, in a carefully drafted opinion, concluded that current
policy considerations justify the extension of established doctrines of joint liabil-
ity to the area of industry-wide cooperation in product manufacture and design.
Although the court carefully couched its language in terms of traditional theories
of joint liability, tis decision clearly represents a unique application of those the-
ories and, consequently, is bound to have a considerable impact upon their future
development.
The court began its analysis of the question of joint liability by citing four dis-
tinguishable situations in which such liability has historically been imposed:
(1) the actors knowingly join in the performance of the tortious act or
acts; (2) the actors fail to perform a common duty owed to the plaintiff;
(3) there is a special relationship between the parties (e.g., master and
servant or joint entrepreneurs); (4) although there is no concerted action
nevertheless the independent acts of several actors concur to produce indi-
visible harmful consequences. 4
The early common law courts imposed joint liability only in the first of these
situations, when the tortfeasors acted in concert to further a common purpose.
Thus in a case involving a group assault, each assailant would be held liable for
the damage done by all.5 It is to this kind of situation that the term "joint tort" is
applied in its strictest sense,6 and all other forms of joint liability have evolved
from it.7
In this process of development, emphasis has gradually shifted away from the
common law requirement of a joint commission of a single wrongful act. Due in
large part to the assistance of statutory enactments, joinder has come to be viewed as
a procedural tool "to expedite justice and avoid a multiplicity of actions .... ,8
The "court in Hall analyzed three policy considerations which have been largely re-
sponsible for this development:
The first is the problem of joint or group control of risk: the need to deter
hazardous behavior by groups of multiple defendants a well as by in-
dividuals. The second is the problem of enterprise liability: the policy of
assighing the forseeable costs of an activity to those in the most strategic
position to reduce them. The third is the problem of fairness with respect
to the burden of proof: the desire to avoid denying recovery to an inno-
cent injured plaintiff because proof of causation may be within defen-
dants' control or entirely unavailable.9
The first of these considerations, that of joint control of risk, has been of pri-
mary importance in those situations in which several defendants breach a common
duty of care owed the plaintiff. Thus courts have had little trouble finding joint
liability in cases in which, for example, plaintiff's property is damaged by the col-
lapse of a party wall 10 or by the explosion of a powder house improperly main-
tained by several defendants."
4 345 F. Supp. at 371, quoting from 1 HARPER & JAMEs, TORTS § 10.1 at 697-98 (1956).
5 Sir John Heydon's Case, 11 Co. Rep. 5, 77 Eng. Rep. 1150 (1613).
6 18 TExAs L. REv. 524 (1940).
7 See Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CAL. L. REv. 413 (1937); Jackson, Joint
Torts and Several Liability, 17 TExAS L. REv. 399 (1939).
84 VAND. L. REv. 192, 194 (1950).
9 345 F. Supp. at 371.
LO Simmons v. Everson, 124 N.Y. 319, 26 N.E. 911 (1891); Klauder v. McGrath, 35 Pa.
128 (1860); Johnson v. Chapman, 43 W. Va. 639,28 S.E. 744 (1897).
11 Prussak v. Hutton, 30 App. Div. 66,51 N.Y.S. 761 (1898).
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Joint control of risk has also given rise to joint liability in situations involving
various kinds of business relationships, such as the "joint enterprise" or "joint ven-
ture."' 2 While the court conceded that the defendants in Hall were probably
not engaged in a "joint venture" as that word is ordinarily used, the court was also
careful to point out that for purposes of determining joint liability, the most im-
portant consideration is not the existence of a "joint venture" among the defen-
dants, but their effective joint control of the risk involved. 13
With respect to the second problem, that of "enterprise liability," the court
observed that joint or vicarious liability has been imposed most often in situations
in which the defendants have been the participants best able to bear the cost in a
risk-creating process. This may frequently be the case even when the plaintiff's in-
jury has been caused "directly" by some other subordinate participant.14 Thus the
manufacturer of a completed product will be held vicariously liable for any defects
in his product, even though he may trace the defect to a component part supplied
by another.15 Similarly, it would not be unreasonable, as the court concluded in
Hall, to impose joint liability upon an entire industry, when it is in a more strategic
position to bear the risk of production than its individual members.
The third problem which confronts courts in imposing joint liability is to
achieve fairness with respect to the allocation of the burden of proof This problem
arises most often in cases involving "concurrent torts," which constitute the fourth
type of situation cited by the court in Hall. This is the situation in which the in-
dependent acts of several defendants combine to produce a single, indivisible result,
as when two motorists collide injuring a third. 16
Courts imposing joint liability in this last type of situation have experienced
some difficulty with the requirement that the harm produced must be "indivisible."
The strict rule, as it was developed at common law, refused to permit joinder
whenever the damage was even theoretically divisible, for example, when the plain-
tiff's sheep had been killed by dogs belonging to different owners,' 7 when a stream
had been polluted by the acts of several persons,'& or when property had been dam-
aged by fumes emitted from different chimneys. 19
The practical effect of this rule was to deprive the plaintiff of any legal rem-
edy by assigning him an oppressive burden of proof. In such instances a plaintiff
who could readily establish fault was faced with the insurmountable problem of
apportioning it. Unless he could show the quantum of damage for which each de-
fendant was responsible, he had no claim against either. The logical solution to this
1 See Mechem, The Law of joint Adventures, 15 MaNN. L. REV. 644 (1931); cases dealing
with various types of "joint venture" situations are collected in Annot., 48 A.L.R. 1055, 1077
(1927), and Annot., 63 A.L.R. 909 (1929).
13 345 F. Supp. at 373.
14 Id. at 376.
15 Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964);
Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 512
(1963). Note that while these decisions are based on modem theories of strict liability, even
before strict liability was recognized the manufacturer of a completed product was subject to
vicarious liability for the negligence of his suppliers, Ford Motor Co. v. Mathis, 322 F.2d 267
(5th Cir. 1963); Boeing Airplane Co. v. Brown, 291 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1961); Dow v. Holly
Manufacturing Co., 49 Cal. 2d 720, 321 P.2d 736 (1958).
16 E.g., Tillman v. Bellamy, 242 N.C. 201, 87 S.B.2d 253 (1955); Meyer v. Cincinnati St. R.
R., 157 Ohio St. 38, 104 N.E.2d 173 (1952).
'7 Nohre v. Wright, 98 Minn. 477, 108 N.W. 865 (1906).
Is Mansfield v. Brister, 76 Ohio St. 270, 81 N.E. 631 (1907).
19 Key v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 18 Ga. App. 472, 89 S.E. 593 (1916).
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dilemma, in keeping with a developing policy of permissive joinder for procedural
convenience, was to shift the burden of apportionment to the defendants, and to
permit joinder when the injury was at least practically indivisible insofar as the
plaintiff was concerned. This solution gained gradual acceptance by the courts.
This approach was adopted in Landers v. East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co.,20
in which a Texas court allowed a plaintiff to proceed against, and to recover from,
two companies for the damage done when they independently discharged salt water
into his lake. The court also noted that either of the defendants could reduce his
own liability by demonstrating the amount of damage for which he alone was re-
sponsible. Thus the burden of apportionment was effectively shifted to the de-
fendants.
This device of shifting the burden of proof was eventually utilized to create
still another extension of the doctrine of joint liability, i.e., the situation, similar
to the one in Hall, in which it is known that only one of several defendants is re-
sponsible for plaintiff's injury, but it is not known which one. The landmark case
dealing with this situation is Summers v. Tice,2 1 in which two hunters were held
jointly and severally liable even though the shot which injured the plaintiff could
have been fired by only one of them. The California court imposed liability on
each of the defendants, not because each was a tortfeasor, but because each had en-
gaged in tortious conduct:
They are both wrongdoers-both negligent toward the plaintiff. They
brought about a situation where the negligence of one of them injured
the plaintiff, hence it should rest with them each to absolve himself if he
can.
2 2
The approach of Landers and Summers has been adopted by the Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 433B, which provides in relevant part:
(2) Where the tortious conduct of two or more actors has combined to
bring about harm to the plaintiff, and one or more of the actors seeks to
limit his liability on the ground that the harm is capable of apportionment
among them, the burden of proof as to the apportionment is upon each
such actor. (3) Where the conduct of two or more actors is tortious, and
it is proved that harm has been caused to the plaintiff by only one of them,
but there is uncertainty as to which one has caused it, the burden is upon
each such actor to prove that he has not caused the harm.23
Initially, it is difficult to understand why the court in Hall felt constrained to
look beyond the Summers rule, as embodied in § 433B(3) of the Restatement,
to support its decision. The Hall situation is not substantially different from that
in Summers except that the defendants were six explosives manufacturers instead of
two hunters. Each of the defendants was alleged to have engaged in the same tor-
tious conduct-the failure to place warning labels on its blasting caps-but it was
not known which of the manufacturers had caused which injuries. The plaintiffs
each knew they had been injured by only one of the defendants, but they could not
point to which one. This seems to be the ideal case for a shift in the burden of
proof to the defendants under the rules developed in Landers and Summers.
Oddly, however, the court stated in Hall that the rule shifting the burden of ap-
portionment to the defendants "is applicable only as a corollary principle of proof
20 151 Tex. 251, 248 S.W.2d 731 (1952).
2133 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
22 Id. at 86, 199 P.2d at 4.
2sTAT h-NT (SECoND) OF ToRTs § 433B (1965).
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to plaintiffs' main theories that defendants engaged in concerted action, or operated
as a joint enterprise, with respect to the labeling and design of the caps." 24  It
would seem here that the court was requiring the plaintiffs to establish both "joint
enterprise" among the defendants and concurrent tortious conduct sufficient to shift
the burden of proof under § 433B of the Restatement. But why should this be
required, when ordinarily each is considered to be, in itself, a separate and distinct
ground for joinder? A possible answer is that the court was more interested in es-
tablishing a precedent for industry-wide liability than for joint liability among a
certain unknown number of manufacturers. "The point is not only that the damage
is caused by multiple actors, but that the sole feasible way of anticipating costs or
damages and devising practical remedies is to consider the activities of a group."'2 5
Obviously, then, the court, in imposing joint liability, was concerned with more
than merely relieving the plaintiff of an unfair burden of proof. It seems that the
court was also attempting to effect, through joint liability, a strategic allocation of the
costs of risk-creating activity, a goal which has come to be associated more commonly
in recent times with strict liability in tort.2 6 Indeed, one of the most significant as-
pects of Hall is that it manages to integrate principles from two important areas of
rapidly developing law: the areas of joint liability and strict liability in tort.
Strict liability, of course, starts from the premise that accidents and injuries are
an inevitable and statistically foreseeable "cost" of production, and then attempts to
allocate that cost where it can be most easily absorbed. As one court has stated,
"The purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from
defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the
market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect them-
selves."127 The court in Hall has merely carried this logic one step further: just as
a manufacturer can bear the cost of risk-creating activity better than an individual,
so, in certain circumstances, can an industry bear the cost better than individual man-
ufacturers.
The device which the court employed to impose this "enterprise liability" upon
an entire industry was the members' "joint control" over the risk-creating activity.
Such control is relatively easy to establish when, as in this case, the industry collec-
tively supports a trade association which assists in setting industry-wide safety stan-
dards. But the court clearly indicated that the kind of organized control suggested
by a trade association is not necessary to support the imposition of joint liability.
A plaintiff, in fact, need only show that each of the individual manufacturers ad-
heres to the industry-wide standard or custom which resulted in the plaintiff's injury,
and their joint control will apparently be presumed.28
In the final analysis, however, it is the doctrine of alternative causation that
makes joinder possible in the Hall case. Clearly, an "industry-wide standard" of
negligence will not, of itself, create joint liability for an entire industry when causa-
tion can be attributed to a single member of that industry. Therefore, it does not
seem that Hall is destined to have any great impact in the area of products liability.
While there may be a number of situations in which plaintiffs may be able to estab-
24 345 F. Supp. at 379.
251d. at 378.
26 See Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J.
499 (1961).
27 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 701 (1963); see also Ognall, Some Facets of Strict Tortious Liability in the United
States and their Implications, 33 NorRE DAME LAw. 239 (1958).
28 345 F. Supp. at 374.
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lish negligence on an industry-wide scale, in almost all such situations the manu-
facturer of the injury-causing product will be identifiable and, consequently, indi-
vidually liable. Only rarely, as with blasting caps, will the infliction of the injury
result in the destruction of the only reliable evidence concerning the product's
manufacturer.
Interestingly, though, as the court itself seems to recognize, this case could have
a signficant impact upon the law governing multiple emitters of water and air pol-
lutants. In these situations it is often difficult, if not impossible, to single out an
individual emitter as the source of damage caused by pollution. A victim of lung
cancer may, for instance, be able to establish that his disease was caused by the heavy
pollution of his urban environment, yet be unable to single out any one emitter
whom he might hold individually liable. In such a situation, the rule established in
Hall might be invoked to permit the joinder of an entire industry (or industries)
whose pollutants can be established as the source of the injury.29
Certainly the goal of risk allocation would be most effectively served by spread-
ing the cost of developing anti-pollution techniques and devices over an entire in-
dustry. In those industries, such as steel or chemicals, in which pollution amounts
to an "industry-wide standard," there should be little problem in finding the req-
uisite "joint control." With a little imagination, the courts could even extend
such a theory to a nuisance cause of action, and impose joint liability on those
industries whose pollutants continue to befoul the nation's air and water.30 Such
a rule could be a powerful interim weapon in the hands of environmentalists await-
ing preemptive legislation in that area.
While the possibilities are alluring, it should nonetheless be noted that the size
of the industry may have been a significant factor in the court's decision in Hall.
It is difficult to determine whether the result would have been the same in Hall
had the explosives industry been a much larger one. "What would be fair and
feasible with regard to an industry of five or ten producers might be manifestly un-
reasonable if applied to a decentralized industry composed of thousands of small
producers." 81
In adding this final caveat, the court has made its way back to the same unarti-
culated problem which confronts any court in the application of the Summers rule.
As long as the number of defendants sought to be joined remains reasonably small,
and their tortious conduct reasonably equivalent, it seems only fair to shift the bur-
den of proof from the innocent victim to the defendants. As the number of de-
fendants increases, however, the application of the rule grows increasingly uncer-
tain, until it is difficult to justify, as a matter of "procedural convenience," a joinder
of, for instance, some 50 hunters (or explosives manufacturers), one of whose con-
duct caused the plaintiff's injury. Unfortunately, the Hall analysis of joint risk
control and enterprise liability is of little assistance in solving this problem.
John F. Zimmerman, Jr.
29 Cf. Rheingold, Civil Cause of Action for Lung Damage Due to Pollution of Urban At-
mosphere, 33 BROOKLYN L. REv. 17, 31-32 (1966).
80 See Katz, The Function of Tort Liability in Technology Assessment, 38 U. CmN. L. REV.
587, 606-27 (1969).
3' 345 F. Supp at 373.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-LIABILITY OF A PRIVATELY OWNED UTILITY UN-
DER 42 U.S.C. § 1983-Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co., 342 F. Supp. 241 (N.D.
Ohio 1972); Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566 (8th Cir.), vacated
as moot - U.S. - , 93 S. Ct. 66, 34 L. Ed. 2d 72 (1972).
In two recent decisions, Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co.1 and Ihrke v. Northern
States Power Co.,2 federal courts found sufficient state involvement in a privately
owned utility's termination of service to a defaulting customer, in accordance with
company regulations, to hold such conduct subject to the 1871 Civil Rights Act (§
1983).3 In Palmer, the court continued in force a restraining order precluding the
gas company from terminating service to customers without due process of law.
This restraining order had been issued as part of plaintiff's combined suit-a class
action for injunctive relief and an individual action seeking damages for wrongful
termination. The trial court had allowed an immediate appeal from this order,
with a continuance on the damage issue. In Ihrke, the appellate court reversed the
dismissal of plaintiff's complaint, which had charged that termination of utility ser-
vices without adequate notice and an impartial hearing was unconstitutional, and
held the action of the company to be "under color of law" within the meaning of
§ 1983. The primary significance of these decisions rests in their potential as prec-
edent for a future holding that mere status as a public utility is sufficient to require
application of fourteenth amendment standards.
Historically, action by a private individual, presumably including a corporate
citizen, has been exempt from constraints prescribed by the federal constitution. If
any such conduct was wrongful, it was at most a private wrong4 and not subject to
action under § 1983. Under appropriate circumstances, however, individual action
loses its essentially private character and, having acquired the attributes of action
by the state, becomes subject to the fourteenth amendment. Basically these circum-
stances can be categorized by one of two alternative theories: (1) public function,
and (2) state action, including the concepts of state involvement and conduct un-
.der color of law. Both theories have possible application to public utilities and,
as will be developed, did receive consideration in one or both of the principal cases.
The public function theory, first articulated in Marsh v. Alabama,5 has as its
main tenet the concept of a private activity established and operated primarily for
the benefit of the public or, as a variant of this, a private activity substituting for
a public one. In Marsh, the Court found that a public function was performed
by the operation of a privately owned company town and suggested in dicta that
privately held bridges, ferries, turnpikes, and railroads may also be included within
1342 F. Supp. 241 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
2459 F.2d 566 (8th Cir.), vacated as moot, - U.S. - , 93 S. Ct. 66, 34 LEd. 2d 72
(1972). Although the vacating of the lower court judgment will deny a stare decisis effect to
this decision, there is no indication that the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit would reach
a contrary result should this same factual pattern be presented again. Furthermore, the im-
mediate value of this case, that is, its use as a vehicle for studying and evaluating the factors
considered in arriving at the conclusion of state involvement, justifies the inclusion of the Ihrke
opinion within this casenote.
3 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Civil action for deprivation of rights. Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.
4 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
5326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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this concept.6 The theory has received broader application in more recent decisions.
In Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza,7 the Court brought a private
shopping center within the proscriptions of the fourteenth amendment by equating
its "public function" activities to those of a city business district. Similarly, in Evans
v. Newton,8 the public function theory was used by the Court as an altern ative deci-
sional basis for bringing a private park, open to the public on a racially restricted
basis, within the fourteenth amendment.
As thus developed, it would not be unreasonable to apply the public function
theory to a private commercial concern which has chosen as its raison d'Stre the provi-
sion of a vital public commodity. Indeed, the pervasiveness of this concept is
indicated by Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Evans. Justice Harlan specifically
mentioned applicability of the public function doctrine to private schools and sug-
gested that this application would merely be the beginning.9 In a recent Seventh
Circuit decision, Lucas v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co.,10 the dissenters adopted
Justice Harlan's suggestion and took the position that a public utility represented
a complete and fully interchangeable government substitute, due to the identity of
function between a municipality and the utility.
Outside the situations of company towns and shopping centers, the public func-
tion theory has generally been disregarded by the courts as a means for bringing
private conduct within federal constitutional proscriptions (Evans v. Newton" is
an exception; however, as noted above, public function served only as an alternative
ground). Contrary to the fears of overzealous application raised by Justice Harlan
in the Evans case, courts have declined to broaden public function even to encom-
pass the suggested private universities. Instead they have indicated that performing
the task of education is not in itself enough to subject the school to liability under §
1983.12 The utilization of the theory has been so limited that no decision has been
found by this writer in which the court has placed sole reliance upon public func-
tion for holding a privately owned utility to federal due process and equal protec-
tion standards.
Rather than public function, the theory more commonly employed for scrutiniz-
ing the conduct of the private individual has been state action.' 3 Under this theory
the individual becomes equated with the state and is thereby subjected to the four-
teenth amendment whenever the governmental unit becomes involved with that in-
dividual's private actions. With increasing governmental regulation and control
over business and the individual, the number of situations in which state action
might logically be found is nearly unlimited. The primary constraint placed upon
this theory, as stated by the Court in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,14
61d. at 506.
7 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
8 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
9 Id. at 321 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
10 466 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972).
"1382 U.S. 296 (1966).
12 Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
13 For the purposes of this case note, state action will be deemed an accepted and viable
doctrine. A comprehensive development and discussion of the concept is available in the many
notable law review articles in this area. See generally Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60
COL M. L. REV. 1083 (1960), and Horowitz, The Misleading Search for "State Action" Un-
der the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 S. CAL. L. REV. 208 (1957). Compare Wechsler, Toward
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959), with Pollak, Racial Dis-
crimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor W'echsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1959).
14 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
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is the requirement that the state be involved to some "significant extent." The
Court acknowledged the absence of a precise, universal formula to follow and in-
stead required the significance of the particular involvement to be determined by an
evaluation of the facts and circumstances in each situation. One element of cer-
tainty was indicated-not every instance of state involvement with the individual
will necessarily convert private activity into state action.
The extent of involvement by the state in public utility operations may best be
seen in an examination of the scheme of pertinent legislative controls affecting these
companies. The legislation generally has two features, a statutory framework within
which the utility must conduct its operations and a public utilities commission
(PUC) whose function it is to ensure compliance or, as the California Supreme
Court has stated, to "protect the people of the state from.., monopoly in the public
service industries."15 While specific legislation may vary among the states, the
general scope of state regulation is adequately reflected in those provisions of the
current Ohio Revised Code relating to customer service.
The state of Ohio requires public utilities to -file company rules and regulations
with the PUC which is authorized to grant its approval or, alternatively, to direct
changes to be made.16 The PUC is also empowered to schedule hearings in which
customer complaints may be aired,17 and it may also, on its own initiative, conduct
hearings into the reasonableness of public service and prescribe changes if re-
quired.' 8 In addition, Ohio may be unique in providing by statute both that the
utility may terminate gas service to a defaulting customer' 9 and that a utility in cer-
tain circumstances moy require a cash deposit before service will be provided. 2°
Despite statutory requirements of active participation and involvement by the
PUC in supervising the activities of the utility, the courts have traditionally taken
the position that this supervision did not constitute state action. In Taglianetti v.
New England Telephone & Telegraph Co.,21 a challenge was made to the utility's
termination of service, pursuant to company regulations, when the customer was
suspected of unauthorized and illegal use of the telephone. Taglianetti reflects the
general attitude that mere filing of regulations with the PUC and their subsequent
approval by the PUC did not constitute state action. In other actions against
utilities § 1983 has been held inapplicable when no showing was made that the
state had encouraged the particular action or benefited therefrom.2 2 The utility's
status as a protected and regulated monopoly has not in itself been enough to find
state action; rather some intrusion by the state into the utility's internal management
has been required.2 Absent this intrusion, utilities have been able to adopt and en-
force what were considered (under the common law) reasonable rules for conducting
their businesses, including the termination of service to customers in default of pay-
ment.24 No fourteenth amendment constraints were imposed.
15 Sale v. Railroad Comm'n, 15 Cal. 2d 612, 617, 104 P.2d 38, 41 (1940).
16 OHo REv. CODE ANN. § 4905.30 (Page 1954).
17 d. § 4905.26.
18 1d. § 4905.37.
19 Id. § 4933.12. The code section does not require termination of gas service for default
but merely authorizes such action; however, authorization in itself may be state action.
20 Id. § 4933.17. Although this section is not applicable to Palmer or Ihrke, conduct pur-
suant to it may lead to liability under § 1983 for violation of equal protection.
2181 R.I. 351, 103 A.2d 67 (1954).
22 Kadlec v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 407 F.2d 624, 626 (7th Cir. 1969).
23 Martin v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 441 F.2d 1116, 1118 (9th Cir. 1971).
24 Siegel v. Minneapolis Gas Co., 271 Minn. 127, 129, 135 N.W.2d 60, 62 (1965).
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In contrast to the majority position outlined above, in Public Utilities Commis-
sion v. Pollak25 the Court "assumed" that the municipal transit company's opera-
tion of the challenged radio service, in concert with the action of the District of
Columbia PUC in permitting such operation, was sufficient federal government
action to render the fifth amendment applicable.28 While the Court noted the
congressionally created monopoly situation, it specifically refused to find govern-
mental action on this ground. Instead the Court based its decision on the presence
of regulatory supervision and particularly upon the fact that the PUC had con-
ducted a hearing and given its approval to the radio service in issue.27
In the discussion to follow, an assessment will be made of the impact of the two
principal decisions upon the concepts of public function and state action. Particu-
lar consideration will be given to the question of whether these concepts have
been broadened so that mere status as a public utility will be sufficient to hold a
private company to fourteenth amendment standards of conduct. For the status
theory to be so recognized, the courts must have either equated provision of utility
services to the public function doctrine, or broadened state action to the point that
governmental regulation in general would constitute sufficient state involvement,
thereby finding state action in the utility's inherent regulation.
As to the publicfunction theory, only the Ihrke court makes any reference to it,
and its consideration is rather cursory.28 Moreover, the court's analysis becomes en-
tangled with the idea of public regulation, thereby losing the pure concept of "pub-
lic function" as conceived in Marsh v. Alabama29 and merging it into the more prev-
alent theory, state action. (It is granted that some may consider public function
and state action to be one and the same, yet it is difficult to reconcile such a propo-
sition with the apparent absence of state involvement with the company town in
Marsh, excluding the arrest and trespass conviction.) Public function as a viable
concept seems relegated to the unique factual situation in which it arose.
Due to the limited development of the public function theory, if a nile is to be
found in these decisions making mere status sufficient to bring a utility within federal
constitutional proscriptions, it must be based on state action, or, mpre properly,
significant state action. Without clear guidelines for a test, the question of signif-
icance may become very elusive in application to a specific situation. Indeed, the
Palmer court admitted that it was confronted with a borderline situation in making
its assessment. Ultimately deciding that regulatory supervision was the key to the
state action question, citing Pollak as precedent, the court referred to two specific
provisions of the Ohio Revised Code-§ 4905.26, authorizing the PUC to sched-
ule hearings fof customer complaints, and § 4933.12, authorizing gas shut-off for
non-payment. If the former code section were the only basis for the decision, then
Palmer would have made a very significant step toward making status the only
criterion by which to judge whether conduct falls within the fourteenth amendment.
Such a provision for customer hearings, although minor in the scheme of statutes,
does represent a truly regulatory power that states would reserve to themselves as a
check on utility activities-the type of regulation inherent in being a public utility.
Closer examination of the opinion suggests, however, that § 4905.26 may only
25 343 U.S. 451 (1952). While the governmental unit involved here is the District of Co-
lumbia, the rationale used by the Court would have applicability whether the constitutional
proscription is the fifth or the fourteenth amendment.
26 Id. at 462-63.
27 Id.
28459 F.2d at 569.
29 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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have had secondary importance in the decision, with the critical element being the
state's grant of shut-off power. The court specifically noted that this latter provi-
sion "dearly does not leave 'untouched the general managerial direction,' "30 a situ-
ation quite unlike "mere regulation." Of particular significance is the court's at-
tempt to distinguish Palmer from Kadlec v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co.,31 in which
it was held that the filing of the regulations, and subsequent activity pursuant
thereto, did not constitute state action. A distinction between the cases based on
the Ohio hearing statute would have been far more theoretical than practical, since
a provision for the review of utility conduct under its regulations may actually
be not that much different from an initial requirement of filing operating regula-
tions for PUC review. When the Palmer-Kadlec comparison is made based on
the shut-off provision, however, a difference becomes quite apparent. The Palmer
court's reference to Pollak, in which the Court gave particular emphasis to the fact
that a PUC hearing had been conducted and the challenged service upheld, may
also suggest that Palmer placed greater emphasis on the shut-off authority, since
PUC approval as in Pollak might be likened to specific state authorization to
conduct business in a particular manner.3 2
As an assessment of the Palmer court's contribution to the state action notion,
the supposition that utilities may be subject to § 1983 as a result of state regulation
is not corroborated. Rather than such a broadly based concept of significant state
action, the decision is grounded on the narrower idea that state action is present
when the state has specifically granted a power to the utility, albeit a common law
power which the company already possessed.33 This narrower position is consis-
tent with a recent decision in the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Lucas v.
Wisconsin Electric Power Co.3 4  Although Wisconsin does provide for PUC hear-
ings at which customer complaints may be aired,35 the court found no state action
in a utility shut-off pursuant to company regulations. Additionally, the Lucas de-
cision suggests that a different issue would have been presented had the controversy
arisen because the utility had been acting under specific state authority, such as the
power to enter private property.36
In Ihrke, like Palmer, the decision initially suggests a very broad approach to
state action. The opinion found several elements present which it labeled as "color
of law," among them, the grant of an exclusive franchise, the authorization to use
public property, and the obligation to file regulations. Thereafter, the court con-
siders the public function doctrine,37 the significance of which was previously dis-
cussed. The identified "color of law" elements are so inherent in the concept of
a public utility as to suggest that the status has become the criterion of state involve-
ment. In the final analysis, however, Ihrke rests on two particular examples of
state involvement, the first being the right of the St. Paul City Council to review
and reject company regulations and, second, the franchise agreement's require-
30 342 F. Supp. at 245.
31407 F.2d 624 (7th Cir. 1969).
3 2 It should be noted that such a reading of Pollak would result in any utility activity becom-
ing state action if it is challenged before the PUC and upheld.
33 A quite analogous situation is presently developing under the Uniform Commercial Code
in regard to repossession of collateral by a secured party after default by the debtor. See Adams
v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Calif. 1972).
34 466 F.2d 638, 654-55 (7th Cir. 1972).
35 Wis. STAT. § 196.26 (1957).
36 466 F.2d at 656.
37459 F.2d at 569.
[Vol. 34
CASE NOTES
ment that the utility pay five percent of its gross earnings to the city.as This
latter element receives the predominant consideration of the court and suggests
the presence of a situation quite similar to that in Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority.39 In Burton, the state had leased restaurant space in a public park-
ing garage as a means of supplementing parking revenues to meet financial obliga-
tions. The state thereby benefited from the racially discriminatory practices of the
restaurant, just as in Ihrke in which the city benefitted directly from the collection
policies of the utility. Not only are benefits derived, the benefits are derived from
a special source of funds-far different from mere taxes. In Ihrke, as in Burton,
the governmental unit was in a position to directly affect the amount of these funds.
While in Burton the state could have prevented racial discrimination through its
initial lease arrangement (although an integrated restaurant may have suffered from
fewer customers), the city of St. Paul had the power to disapprove offensive util-
ity collection practices. In Ihrke, then, the mere supervisory powers became so
entwined with the revenue provision that it is difficult to assert that regulation per
se would have been a sufficient basis for the decision.
Taking Palmer and Ihrke together, it appears that, while a very expanded notion
of state action is suggested, both decisions can be explained along traditional lines
of analysis-significant state involvement is present when a private individual acts
pursuant to specific state authorization or when private conduct directly benefits the
state. Under such circumstances, a utility, or any other private activity, should be
subject to liability under § 1983. Hence, these cases were properly decided.
Inasmuch as the courts have recognized utility service as an important right,40
a significant question remains of what can be done to safeguard this right for all
utility customers. If due process is thought to be the best protection, then the
courts must adopt a more expansive theory than that relied upon in Palmer and lhrke
for bringing utilities within the fourteenth amendment. The presence of specific
statutes and the profit sharing provision makes these two cases unique and drastical-
ly limits them as precedent. Broader exposure of utilities to § 1983 might arise if
consideration were given to reviving and broadening the public function concept
or to further developing the idea employed in Pollak, i.e., that sufficient govern-
mental involvement can be found if a utility activity has been challenged be-
fore the PUC and the activity has been upheld. An even more expansive concept
of state action could be constructed as follows: The state's initial decision to fur-
nish gas, electricity, and telephone services by a monopoly, which is the most eco-
nomically efficient method, and the state's designation of specific companies as sup-
38 It is assumed that the five percent of gross earnings is in addition to any taxes occurring
in the normal course of business that the utility would have to pay to the state or a subdivision
thereof.
39 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
40 That there is a right to utility service appears to be well settled in the case law. The older
notion that such service was a private contract with the rights and obligations of the partiesbeing based thereon, as suggested by Pollock v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 289 Mass. 255,
260, 194 N.E. 133, 135 (1935), has been displaced by a property right theory requiring due
process of law before any governmental deprivation, Telephone News Sys., Inc. v. Illinois Bell
Tel. Co., 220 F. Supp. 621, 625-26 (N.D. Ill. 1963), affd Per curiam, 376 U.S. 782 (1964).
The foundation of this property right theory lies primarily in the common law applicable to
utilities which required them to serve where feasible all members of the public. See Pike v.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 263 Ala. 59, 60, 81 So. 2d 264 (1955). Lest there be any doubt,
in a very recent decision the Court accepted the position of Congress that both personal and
property rights are within the purview of § 1983. Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S.
538, 552 (1972).
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pliers makes the sale of these services state action. Before such arguments are
presented to the courts, however, consideration should be given to what customer
benefits would be derived from a finding of significant state involvement and the
resultant requirement of due process.
Due process has been held to require notice and an opportunity to be heard.41
Taking the latter requirement first, neither Palmer nor Ihrke specifically stated that
a pre-termination hearing was mandatory, although in Ihrke the complaint filed
in the trial court sought such a determination. Indeed, provision for a judicial or
administrative hearing may be precluded as a matter of practicability. As the
court notes in Palmer, in the Toledo, Ohio, area during a typical calendar year,
Columbia Gas sends out to its 140,000 customers from 120,000 to 140,000 shut-
off notices, each indicating a utility bill which is at least two months in arrears.
Out of this same group, 6,000 terminations are actually made. Even if a hearing
were only required prior to an actual shut-off, the administrative and judicial bur-
den would be overwhelming, if done on a state-wide basis with present staffing.
An additional aspect of the hearing question is to determine what actually
would be gained by such a procedure. In those situations in which an irrecon-
cilable dispute exists as to the amount actually owed, the real value of an impartial
hearing comes to light. What proportion of the notices may have issued as a re-
sult of such disputes is uncertain; however, it would seem that the greater percen-
tage arises from the customer's inability to pay. In this latter case, very little would
be accomplished by an appearance before a neutral party, except to verify the cus-
tomer's inability and to allow a credit agreement or comparable understanding to
be worked out between the parties, under the supervision of the hearing officer.
Although ancillary to its decision,42 the court in Lucas suggested that the avail-
ability to the customer of certain informal and formal remedies would satisfy due
process without the need for a pre-termination hearing. The informal means in-
cluded both working with utility company personnel to resolve the problem and
utilizing the offices of the state PUC. As the Palmer court noted, however, rec-
onciling differences through the utility has inherent disadvantages which may be
aggrevated by a lack of cooperative effort, although it can hardly be denied that this
should be the first step in any dispute.
Seeking resolution through the PUC on an informal basis would present its
own special problems. Particularly significant would be the problems of time de-
lay in written correspondence, the spatial separation between the customer and the
agency, and perhaps the customer's lack of knowledge that such a means is avail-
able to him.
The suggested formal alternatives-injunction, payment under dispute with a
suit to recover, and tort action for wrongful termination-would all require legal
action to be initiated by the customer. Viewed with _regard to the monetary
amounts typically involved and the expenses of litigation, such alternatives, while
presumably providing due process, seem unreasonable both for the indigent customer
and for the one who can afford to pay but disputes his bill.
The greater benefit of due process would be a requirement that the customer
be warned that his service is in actual jeopardy, thus allowing a proper course of
action to be taken in an effort to preclude termination. It is significant, however,
that proper notice could be required even without a finding of state action. At
common law, the utility is permitted to make reasonable rules and regulations for
41 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,313 (1950).
42466 F.2d at 648-50.
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conducting its business. 43 It could be reasonably argued that a summary termina-
tion of utility service with insufficient warning to allow the customer to protect his
rights would be unreasonable. Such an argument would attain the desired objec-
tive of notice without establishing the precedent that a utility is in itself state ac-
tion.
The use of due process as a theory for protecting the rights of utility customers
actually will offer little benefit to the individual. The requirement of notice can be
achieved by an alternate theory, and the opportunity to be heard before termination,
as presently available, may be more theoretical than practical. In addition, a broad
finding that a public utility's activity is state action may present an undesirable side
effect of unduly restricting the utility's managerial discretion in carrying out its oper-
ations. Such a situation might hypothetically arise under the present natural gas
shortage and moratorium on new service, such that a potential new customer would
claim denial of service to him violates equal protection, despite the fact that by ex-
tending service to such persons the gas supply for present customers would be
reduced.
It would seem more appropriate for protection of the customer to come not
from the judiciary but rather from the legislature, acting on its own or through the
PUC. Appropriate measures should be taken to ensure that termination notices
are sent out sufficiently in advance to allow effective response by the recipient; 44
that notices are not used for harassment, but to actually warn the customer of the
impending action; that the customer is aware of the availability of the PUC or
the courts to aid in resolution of disputes, information ideally provided in the shut-
off notice; and that service will not be terminated while a determination is pending
before an administrative or judicial body, without requiring the customer to seek an
injunction through the courts. 45 This should not, however, be considered an ex-
haustive listing. The legislature might also evaluate the benefits of designating local
hearing officers to augment those presently serving the PUC in its central office,
and, of even greater significance, it should consider legislation to preclude or limit
termination of utility service to persons within the categories such as the elderly,
the physically and mentally ill or disabled,46 and recipients of welfare benefits.
Governmental units have previously made the judgment that persons within such
categories are deserving of special consideration and benefits. It would be entirely
consistent to ensure the provision of necessary public services.
William L. Neal
43 See Seaton Mountain Elec. Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Idaho Springs Inv. Co., 49 Colo.
122, 111 P. 834 (1910) and Cardone v. Consol. Edison Co., 197 Misc. 188, 94 N.Y.S.2d 94
(Sup. Ct. 1949), aff'd without opinion, 276 App. Div. 1068, 96 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1950), appeal
denied, 277 App. Div. 769,97 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1950).
44 In this respect, the Ohio statutory shut-off provision, § 4933.12, with its provision for 24
hours' notice, may be deficient.
45 For over half a century in Ohio protection has been provided to the customer under the
common law against termination while a bill is in dispute, Mansfield v. Humphreys Mfg. Co.,
82 Ohio St. 216, 92 N.E. 233 (1910), although the customer has been required to seek a court
injunction to accomplish this. This requirement seems unnecessarily grudging, and, as sug-
gested in the text of this article, the expense may coerce a customer into paying an unfair bill.
46 Massachusetts presently has a statute prohibiting termination of water to a seriously ill per-
son, if written notice is provided to the utility by municipal health authorities or a registered
physician. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN,, ch. 165 § 11B (1970).
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